This article was originally posted on the Harvard International Review.  See the original here.

Institutions and Iraq

While war is a permanent fixture of human existence, it is also the most effective catalyst for significant changes in the structure of the international community. The manner in which order is reestablished and how power is redistributed after a war is the topic of many theories on international politics – from constructivism to neo-liberalism to institutionalism. The chief aim of this essay is to discuss the institutional model of postwar power distribution and apply that theory to the current problem of postwar order and stability in Iraq. The regime change is now complete in Iraq, but neither has stability been achieved nor have long-term solutions been implemented that will guarantee a favorable US-oriented regional order in the Middle East. In applying this model to the Iraq question, it is the author’s intention to suggest a policy that will move both US national security objectives toward a more stable and long-term power distribution arrangement in the Middle East. If the United States is able to create the conditions for lasting peace in the region, it must start with stabilizing and binding multilateral institutions. In the words of Arendt, “The chief reason warfare is still with us is neither a secret death-wish of the human species, nor an irrepressible instinct of aggression, nor finally and more plausibly, the serious economic and social dangers inherent in disarmament, but the simple fact that no substitute for this final arbiter in international affairs has yet appeared on the political scene” (1972).

Institutionalism: Its Roots and Concepts

After the end of World War II, the world entered a period of asymmetric power distribution that has never been seen before in history. The United States emerged as the clear benefactor of this power imbalance and remains so today in spite of a 40-year Cold War, economic globalization, and the regular eruption of numerous regional and trans-regional conflicts. The various international institutions established after World War II (and carried through the Cold War) still hold a significant position in international political affairs, and these institutions have served to maintain notable stability in political relations. Although not originally designed for purposes of stabilization, both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are excellent examples of institutions that evolved from postwar orders and that have created stability while preserving the power positions that resulted from war. These institutions have helped to create a set of long-lasting and stable US-European and US-Japanese relationships. Institutions such as these represent concessions to asymmetric power, and are determined to be in the best interest of both the primary power and secondary nations.

 In his book, After Victory, G. John Ikenberry identifies the framework and underpinnings of the institutional theory of postwar international relations in a compelling and descriptive manner. Ikenberry identifies the current power inequity that exists and the need for the United States to be informed about the nature of stable orders via institutions.  The model presents the institutional theory in contrast with neo-liberalism and constructivism, and offers “an argument about the general sources of stable political order, domestic and international. Stable orders are those in which the returns to power are relatively low and the returns to institutions are relatively high.…If the argument in this book is correct, American foreign policy makers need to be reminded what characteristics of the postwar order have made American power reasonably acceptable to other states and peoples during and after the Cold War” (2001, 258).  Ikenberry’s work forms the foundation for the arguments expressed in this policy recommendation piece.

That the United States was unrivaled in power in 1945 was not nearly as evident as it became in 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the fact that European powers saw the great inequity at the close of WWII and strove to achieve lasting institutional bonds is significant. In retrospect, postwar US foreign, economic, and national security policy-makers had three basic choices in response to the existence of new asymmetry of power: a) dominate the international community (become a hegemon), b) abandon the battlefield (revert to isolationism as they had following WWI), or c) transform its position (institutionalize the environment). Unique to the US choice, according to Ikenberry, was that “removed from both Europe and Asia, the United States was able to conceive of security relations more broadly and with an eye to the long term” (2001, 170).  Additionally, the United States distinctly believed that economic inequality and closed markets were the largest contributors to political instability and conflict abroad; both presented a fertile seedbed for postwar world order commitment.

Thus, the idea of transforming its position as a world power became a particularly attractive option throughout the Cold War – and it remains today. Transformation requires constant redress of approach to the three spheres of US National Security concern: foreign policy; economic, trade, and environmental issues; and enlarged national security policies. The post-Cold War approach must continue to include ideals central to the institutional theory framework: collective security, alliances and coalitions, and dominance of international law—all components of democratic values (Jordan, et al, 14-16). Similarly, the nature of American democracy and capitalism in Ikenberry’s view presents itself as both an objective for international transformation as well as a catalyst for international transformation (2001, 164).

Road Signs to Institutionalism

Ikenberry posits that the choices America made in choosing institutionalism were affected by 1) The character of the postwar order and the dominance of two competing ideologies (capitalistic democracy and communism); 2) The extent of the asymmetries and the types of states involved in institution building (industrial democracies); 3) The remarkable effect of industrialized democracies on post-war order (transmission of democratic values and globalization of economies); and 4) The two great fears of secondary states (abandonment or domination by US power). On one end of the spectrum, the idea that the United States could remain isolationist in its approach to global order remained strong following WWI. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the US might have chosen to dominate the international community, but it is fair to argue that the democratic form of government played a significant role in preventing this outcome:

Arguably, the United States exists today mired in duality between a cultural and economic imperialistic strategy and a strong grasp of liberal democratic values (Kaplan, 2005). US concern over both postwar economic and security conditions resulted in an aggressive push toward open and free economic trade – particularly with Europe. The idea of a European Common Market was proposed and pushed by the United States to ensure open access to export venues, foreign investment, and labor markets, which by its nature may be considered imperialistic. Additionally, the establishment of military bases worldwide has not been to colonize, but to insure that stability and access are maintained for pursuit of US interests. These factors resulted in a condition that coupled inherently dualistic US tendencies with European concerns over collective security, abandonment, and economic recovery. They also led to the establishment of international institutions like NATO and the WTO. Ikenberry identifies that, “over time, postwar settlements have moved in the direction of an institutionalized order, and have begun to take on some constitutional characteristics. Power is exercised—at least to some extent—through agreed-upon institutional rules and practices, thereby limiting the capacities of states to exercise power in arbitrary and indiscriminate ways or use their power advantages to gain a permanent advantage over weaker states” (2001, 19).

Through institutions, argues Ikenberry, America is able to continually pursue both a multilateral system of free trade and an open and pluralistic Western order (2005, 185). One of the Ikenberry’s most profound assertions is that to achieve long-term stability America has had to engage in restraint while pursuing its strategic goals, thereby lowering the uncertainty of outcome that might have pushed America’s new allies away. It has been needed to entice the participation of secondary states in an open and transparent system of government that would allow European and Asian partners to influence the goals and objectives of international policies (2005, 200-202).

In its entirety, Ikenberry’s work effectively describes the evolution of the institutional model as a process of postwar resolution and order-building. The next logical step, having extracted the general principles and processes of institutionalism, is to apply the institutional model to the current crisis in Iraq and the greater Middle East. In this model, several significant applications exist by which peace and stability may come as a lower price to US foreign policy. The application of sound principles to resolve the Iraqi postwar order has never been more critical than today.

Iraq: Modern Applications of the Institutional Model

The postwar problems in Iraq concisely represent an immediate and useful application of the institutional model. While the effective sphere of influence is large and has many secondary players, the war-fighting has been within only one state’s borders. Due to the limited number of primary players, therefore, this is a fairly simplistic instance to which the institutional model may be applied. The ability to tie Iraq into institutional commitments will likely have a much broader effect on the Greater Middle East in years to come – regardless of whether or not democracy in its Western form takes root there within the next decade. The use of institutions as a stabilizing force will likely have greater long-term effect, so there must be continued patience and vigilance while the effects take their course. By comparing the principles drawn from historical applications of the institutional theory and applying them to current issues in the Iraq dilemma, a number of positive conclusions may result.

Iraq’s current post-conflict instability presents three distinct challenges to which the institutional model must be applied to create transformation: 1) Power and state-character asymmetries exist with respect to ethnic and religious values, and the relative position of natural resources within both Iraq and the surrounding nations that are a threat to the establishment of long-term peace and order; 2) Alignment with the long-term national security interests of the United States, as joint institutional commitments in both regional economic growth and mutual security commitment will likely relieve the fears of abandonment or domination by the US that exist in Iraq and other Middle Eastern states; and 3) The political and social fabric of Iraq (and its neighbors) requires transformation to democratic values while retaining its Islamic roots, which can best be achieved through the formation of institutions that focus on the development of modern free-market economies. In 2005, the National Security Council published the “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.” This document provides the framework for what the Bush administration perceives as conditions for the “win.” Cross-referencing this document with the goals and conditions previously mentioned indicates an already significant alignment exists. This alignment should apply the use of institutions as a force for asymmetric stability, regional security, and economic growth through mutual commitment and restraint, as well as the spread of democratic values.

 
Challenges and Opportunities: Economics

The power imbalance that exists in the Middle East is not based merely on military might, but rather on a combination of economic output, military resources, and collateral treaties. In the realm of economic output, petroleum production, which is vital to the Iraqi economy, offers a useful starting place to apply the institutional model for transformation. As a percentage of GDP of the Gulf States (including Iraq), petroleum remains the top income producer. The protection of petroleum reserves remains at the top of national security interests of most global industrial nations, thereby creating a continued platform for cooperation. It is the local distribution of these resources among the ethnic and religious regions – particularly in postwar Iraq – that is troubling. The largest oil fields are within the self-proclaimed borders of the Kurdish region of Northern and Eastern Iraq, and their continued push for regional autonomy is a source of tremendous internal conflict within Iraq. Sunni and Shi’a ethnic groups, vying for political control of postwar Iraq, are pushing for a larger stake in the control of economic resources. A power-sharing solution (collective ownership of the oil reserves and refineries) should be established by creating a joint intrastate economic institution similar to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Stated objectives of this body could then include joint regulation formulation, joint capital and labor application, and joint administration of natural resources like petroleum. Collaborative economic growth may help drastically stabilize the ethnic and religious tensions that exist internally in Iraq.
With further respect to joint economic institutions and their effect on mutual restraint and security, there are a number of opportunities for growth. There exist no unifying economic institutions in Iraq, although the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have attempted to fill some unifying role focused primarily on social and economic cooperation—product-oriented trade blocs. However, OPEC and the GCC have not contributed to internal stability within its member states. The Victory in Iraq document continually identifies national institutions as a critical component of stability, and the model suggests that these institutions are necessary to complete the transformation to postwar order. These types of national institutions lower the returns to power that often follow periods of instability. The establishment of a NAFTA-type arrangement between the United States, Iraq, and other regional players that the United States hopes to engage directly could provide a stimulus for further institutionalization. Foreign policy decision-making by the United States must envision the long-term economic growth potential in Iraq if the United States intends to lead the way forward in the Middle East. Economic leadership is no longer optional; it is required.

On Security

Shifting focus to security, it must be noted that there is no regional model for shared security. That Middle Eastern nations are concerned about security is certainly no surprise. The CIA reports that expenditures on military growth in Middle Eastern nations has increased dramatically in the past few year, particularly as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but none of those funds are being channeled into a common security apparatus. In sharp contrast, the gross combined military expenditures for the NATO members are in excess of US$850 billion and offer a markedly different level of stability between its member states. Significant financial commitments to NATO help to induce shared values in the institution and a desire for institutional endurance. Conflicts like the Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait might be avoided if a regional body for mutual security is institutionalized in the Middle East, and significant investment of member nations – like that of NATO – may offer a stabilizing effect throughout the region.  Additionally, a NATO-type organization—with the United States in a significant leadership role—that builds mutual accountability for shared security concerns in the regions would not only create a more stable Middle East, but also may produce a tranquilizing effect on nations like Russia and China. Direct relationships between US national security institutions and Iraqi institutions appear very appropriate and would directly address the administration’s goal to “build Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society” (2005, 2).

Expanding Liberal Democracies

Finally, transformation in Iraq cannot be complete without a strategic push for democratic institutionalization. Liberal democratic governments are rare in the Middle East. Israel and Egypt are the only democratic-style governments within the Greater Middle East, and none of the Gulf Coast states are democracies. To reach the level of stability implied in the institutional model, democratic reform must be continually pursued as a top priority for the long-term. The expansion of free-market economic trade between the United States, Iraq, and its regional neighbors is one particular area of untapped potential. Michael Mandelbaum recently published the following ideas in Foreign Affairs, “If popular sovereignty is relatively easy to establish, the other component of democracy, liberty, is far more difficult to secure. This accounts for…the continuing difficulties in establishing it in the twenty-first [century]. Putting the principle of liberty into practice requires institutions….Operating such institutions requires skills, some of them highly specialized. And the relevant institutions must be firmly anchored in values: people must believe in the importance of protecting these zones of social and civic life from state interference....The key to establishing a working democracy, and in particular the institutions of liberty, has been the free-market economy" (2007, 122-124).

The continued emphasis on formulating institutions that stimulate democratic values such as liberty, personal ownership, and mutual restraint is a critical component of a stable Middle East as well a necessary tool in the continuing War on Terror. US leadership in Iraq must be clearly focused on supporting the institutional model's modicum of high returns to institutions. Ikenberry suggests, “When political orders are organized in ways that constrain the ability of one actor or group to dominate or to wield power arbitrarily or indiscriminately, other actors and groups are more likely to abide by rules and outcomes that the political order generates at the moment” (2001, 266). Krauthammer has framed this concept well in stating, “Established civilized, decent, nonbelligerent, pro-Western polities in…Iraq and ultimately [its] key neighbors would, like the flipping of Germany and Japan in the 1940s, change the strategic balance…” (2004, 16).

Clearly, the institutional model provides tremendous insight and resource for continued strategic formulation and resolution to postwar Iraq. If the institutional model is applied effectively among the US, Iraq, and regional partners, long-term peace and stability are much more likely. Global and regional power restraint, shared commitment to binding institutions in economics and security, and shared values of democracy and liberty are necessary components of a winning strategy in Iraq and the Middle East.

Last update: 11-06-2008 01:55